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Abstract
We examine assignment games, where matched pairs of firms and workers create some mon-
etary value to distribute among themselves and the agents aim to maximize their payoff. In
the majority of this literature, externalities - in the sense that a pair’s value depends on the
pairing of the others - have been neglected. However, in most applications a firm’s success de-
pends on, say, the success of its rivals and suppliers. Thus, it is natural to ask how the classical
results on assignment games are affected by the introduction of externalities? The answer is –
dramatically. We find that (i) a problem may have no stable outcome, (ii) stable outcomes can
be inefficient (not maximize total value), (iii) efficient outcomes can be unstable, and (iv) the
set of stable outcomes may not form a lattice. We show that stable outcomes always exist if
agents are "pessimistic." This is a knife-edge result: there are problems in which the slightest
optimism by a single pair erases all stable outcomes.
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JEL: C71, C78, D62
1. Introduction
We consider assignment games in which firms hire workers after negotiating salaries. They
were first studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Shapley and Shubik (1971) and
provide a primitive model of the job market; see Roth and Sotomayor (1992) for a survey.
We introduce externalities into the model: the success of a firm and a worker depends on
the pairing of the other firms and workers. Thus, it is natural to ask how the classical results
on assignment games are affected by the introduction of externalities? Our study suggests
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– dramatically. As we will see, all of the classical findings of Shapley and Shubik (1971) are
overturned.
In most of the literature, it is implicitly assumed that agents’ preferences are independent
of how the other agents are matched. However, it is not difficult to see that externalities may
play an important role. Consider for instance a firm that produces phones. Surely, its success
stems mainly from the competence of its employees. But the success of firms that produce
complementary goods (say network capacity and signal) may also have some importance,
and the lack of success of its rival firms that produce similar phones could be influential as
well. Therefore, the question we ask is a highly relevant one.
In the related literature, Li (1993) was the first to introduce externalities into the one-to-
one, two-sided matching market by assuming that each agent has strict preferences over the
set of all possible matchings. He finds that equilibrium may not exist in general, but it does
if the externalities are small enough: more specifically, if an agent’s preferences over match-
ings is lexicographically determined, first and foremost by his partner and then by how the
other agents are matched. Similarly, Sasaki and Toda (1996) also find non-existence when
expectation about residual behavior is determined endogenously. They show that there is
always a stable matching if estimation functions on the set of possible outcomes are exoge-
nously given. They are the first to examine assignment games with externalities, and find that
a stable matching exists if agents find all matchings to be possible. Taking this approach one
step further, Hafalir (2008) introduces endogenous beliefs depending on the preferences. He
confirms the anticipation of Sasaki and Toda (1996) that rational expectations do not guar-
antee existence. He introduces the notion of sophisticated expectations, determined via an
algorithm, inducing a game without externalities at the end, and shows that the resulting set
of stable matchings is non-empty. To achieve non-emptiness, he assumes that there is no
commitment; that is, a blocking pair can split up if they can get better off by blocking again
through a different pair. Eriksson et al. (2011) consider assignment games where agents ex-
perience negative externalities from the payoffs of the agents on the same side of the market
in form of ill will. They define a new, weaker notion of stability assuming bounded rationality,
and show that such stable outcomes always exist. In a recent discussion paper, Chen (2013)
examines a model similar to ours. Some of the results overlap (also noted in his paper) though
for instance our negative result (Theorem 2) is stronger than his as he uses estimation func-
tions that are not matching dependent. Furthermore, he focuses more on applications and
less on properties of the set of stable outcomes than we do.
It is clear from the results summarized above that the introduction of externalities causes
many issues which need to be resolved. For instance, it is not unambiguous how to generalize
the notion of blocking and how to define stability. We introduce externalities into assignment
games by allowing the values of matched pairs to depend on how the rest of the agents are
matched. We look for stable outcomes in the standard sense: an outcome is stable if it is
individually rational and has no blocking pairs. However, it is not straightforward how one
should define the notion of blocking in this environment.
Formally, we model the externalities as follows. The value a firm and a worker create in
a matching - that is, the amount of money they divide into profit and salary - depends on
how the other agents are organized. An outcome specifies a matching as well as a profit for
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each firm and a salary for each worker. A firm f and a worker w block an outcome if they are
both better off when f lays off its current employee and hires w instead, who resigns from her
current firm. However, f and w have to take into account the fact that if they deviate from the
current outcome, then this changes the values and hence the behavior of the other matched
pairs as well.1 As a consequence, others may re-match, changing the value of f and w .
Here, we aim to cover as many behavioral assumptions or beliefs as possible by applying a
very general definition of blocking. When agents are deciding whether to form a blocking pair,
they take the values for all contingencies into account. According to their attitude towards risk
or beliefs about the other agents, they calculate a threshold based on the possible outcomes
and form a blocking pair whenever this threshold exceeds the sum of their current payoffs. By
using this general definition, we avoid imposing any initial assumption on beliefs or residual
behavior. In turn, we can distinguish different types of agents based on how they determine
their threshold.
Our first and positive finding is that, if all agents are pessimistic, then there always exists
a stable outcome (Proposition 1).
The main result of the paper, Theorem 2, shows the necessity of pessimism. If there is just
one pair that at one matching is slightly optimistic, then there are values such that the cor-
responding assignment game with externalities lacks a stable outcome.2 This finding is very
strong as it requires only the smallest conceivable form of optimism. Although, it exploits that
externalities may be arbitrarily large. However, even if externalities are reasonably bounded,
the negative result is still preserved (Example 5). Furthermore, we can find assignment games
with vanishingly small externalities that lack stable outcomes if agents are sufficiently opti-
mistic (Example 2).
In contrast to problems without externalities, stability and efficiency no longer go hand in
hand. Specifically, when there are no externalities, stable matchings maximize the total value
generated. In Example 3, we provide a simple problem in which an inefficient matching is
stable whereas an efficient matching is unstable. However, if all agents are pessimistic - which
guarantees that there exists a stable outcome - then there always exists a Pareto optimal stable
outcome (Proposition 2). In Example 4 we highlight another discrepancy compared to games
without externalities; namely, that the set of stable outcomes does not form a complete lattice.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3, we
first discuss existence of stable outcomes, then efficiency, and then the structure of the set
of stable outcomes. In Section 4, we examine a more restrictive setting and show that our
negative results persist. We conclude in Section 5.
1These considerations are typically referred to as residual behavior in the cooperative game theory literature.
Whereas these reactions do not play a role in problems without externalities, different assumptions and expecta-
tions about residual behavior lead to different outcomes being stable when externalities are present. They range
from the pessimistic approach of Aumann and Peleg (1960) to the optimistic one of Shenoy (1980).
2Results of a similar nature have been found for cooperative games (Funaki and Yamato, 1999; Kóczy, 2007)
and housing markets (Mumcu and Saglam, 2007).
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2. Model
2.1. Preliminaries
There are m firms F and n =m workers W , with N ≡ F ∪W .3 A firm can employ at most
one worker and no two can employ the same. A matching is a bijection µ : F → W . The
set of matchings is M . We use the notation that, if µ( f ) = w , then ( f , w) ∈ µ. Moreover, let
M =M f w ∪M− f w where, for each µ ∈M , we have µ ∈M f w if and only if µ( f )=w . All firm-
worker pairs generate a monetary value which they divide in the form of profits and salaries.
For each f ∈ F and w ∈ W , α f w :M f w → R+ maps a value to each matching. Note that we
may have α f w (µ) 6=α f w (µ′). Let A ≡ (α f w ) f ∈F,w∈W and letA be the collection of all such lists
of value functions A.
A payoff vector for F is u ∈ Rm+ , where u f is firm f ’s profit. Likewise, a payoff vector for
W is v ∈ Rn+, where vw is worker w ’s salary. Payoff vectors (u, v) ∈ Rm+ ×Rn+ are compatible
with µ ∈M in A ∈A if, for all f ∈ F and w = µ( f ), u f + vw = α f w (µ). An outcome of A ∈A
is (µ,u, v) ∈M ×Rm+ ×Rn+ such that (u, v) are compatible with µ in A. Given A ∈A , µ ∈M is
efficient if, for all µ′ ∈M , ∑
( f ,w)∈µ
α f w (µ)≥
∑
( f ,w)∈µ′
α f w (µ
′).
If, for all f ∈ F , w ∈W , and {µ,µ′} ⊆M , we have, with some abuse of notation, α f w (µ) =
α f w (µ
′) ≡ α f w , we say there are no externalities. Denote the collection of assignment games
without externalities withA 0. A pair ( f , w) ∈ F ×W blocks the outcome (µ,u, v) of A ∈A 0 if
u f + vw <α f w . An outcome (µ,u, v) is stable in A ∈A 0 if no pair blocks it.
Theorem 1 (Shapley and Shubik, 1971). Let A ∈A 0 and (µ,u, v) ∈M ×Rm+ ×Rn+.
1. If (µ,u, v) is stable in A, then µ is efficient in A.
2. If (µ,u, v) is stable in A and µ′ ∈M is efficient, then (µ′,u, v) is stable in A.
3. The set of stable outcomes of A forms a non-empty complete lattice with respect to the
firms’ profits and the workers’ salaries.
We ask if any of these results still hold on the larger domainA , that is, when externalities
are present. Before we can even start answering that we first have to define stable outcomes
in games with externalities. The following example shows that this is not straightforward.
Example 1: What outcomes are stable? Consider the assignment game with externalities with
agents F = { f1, f2, f3} and W = {w1, w2, w3}. Table 1 displays the values created by the different
pairs; all other values are zero. Is the outcome (µ1,u, v) with u = (1,1,1) and v = (1,1,0) stable?
Except for f2 and w3, no pair has anything to gain from deviating from (µ1,u, v). The
stability of the outcome therefore boils down to whether f2 and w3 object to it. We have u f2 +
vw3 = 1+0= 1 and
α f2w3 (µ2)= 0< 1< 2=α f2w3 (µ3).
3That n =m is without loss of generality as we can create “null-agents” to balance the count, that is, agents
that create no value in any pair.
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Matching Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3
µ1 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w3)} 2 2 1
µ2 = {( f1, w2), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w1)} 2 0 2
µ3 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w2)} 2 2 1
Table 1: Values for Example 1. For instance, the "0" indicates that f2 and w3 are matched at µ2 and
generate a value of 0.
In words, it is sensible for f2 and w3 to break up their current partnerships and match with
one another if the resulting matching formed thereupon is µ3, but not if it is µ2. However, this
is out of their control. Hence, whether they will block the outcome depends on whether they
are optimistic (expect µ3 to be formed) or pessimistic (expect µ2). ◦
We wish to formalize the insights of Example 1. Agents have expectations on what will oc-
cur as a consequence of them deviating from an outcome. A pair of agents block an outcome
if their "blocking threshold" exceeds their joint payoffs. We need three objects to formalize
this. For each ( f , w) ∈ F ×W , define the optimistic value ω f w as the largest value the pair
can achieve. Conversely, define the pessimistic value pi f w as the smallest value the pair can
achieve (that is, the value the pair can guarrantee itself). In Example 1, we have ω f2w3 = 2 and
pi f2w3 = 0.
ω f w =α f w (µ) for some µ ∈M f w and, for each µ′ ∈M f w , ω f w ≥α f w (µ′)
pi f w =α f w (µ) for some µ ∈M f w and, for each µ′ ∈M f w , α f w (µ′)≥pi f w
Certainly, f and w have strong reasons to object to an outcome in which u f + vw < pi f w – if
they break up their current partnerships and form one together, they are better off no mat-
ter how the other agents react. For each f ∈ F and w ∈ W , λ f w : M− f w → [0,1] is used to
determine the blocking threshold:
b f w (µ)=λ f w (µ) ·ω f w +
(
1−λ f w (µ)
) ·pi f w .
A pair ( f , w) ∈ F ×W is optimistic at µ ∈M− f w if λ f w (µ) = 1. Conversely, the pair is pes-
simistic if λ f w (µ)= 0.
Definition 1. An assignment game with externalities is (N , A,λ), where A ∈A andλ≡ (λ f w ) f ∈F,w∈W .
The collection of assignment games with externalities is E .
A pair ( f , w) ∈ F ×W blocks the outcome (µ,u, v) of (A,λ) ∈ E if u f + vw < b f w (µ). An
outcome (µ,u, v) is stable in (A,λ) ∈ E if no pair blocks it.
3. Results
We first observe that the set of stable outcomes for an assignment game with externalities
is related to that of a particular game without externalities. The finding is straightforward and
essentially follows from the definitions.
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Observation 1. An outcome (µ,u, v) ∈M ×Rm+ ×Rn+ is stable in (A,λ) ∈ E if and only if (µ,u, v)
is stable in B ∈A 0, where B = (β f w ) f ∈F,w∈W and
β f w =
{
α f w (µ) if ( f , w) ∈µ
b f w (µ) if ( f , w) 6∈µ.
Proof. Let (µ,u, v) be stable in (A,λ). We proceed in two steps. First, we show that (µ,u, v) is
an outcome of B . Then we show that (µ,u, v) is stable in B .
Step 1: As (µ,u, v) is an outcome of (A,λ), for each f ∈ F and w = µ( f ), u f + vw =α f w (µ).
By construction, α f w (µ) = β f w . Therefore u f + vw = β f w for all f ∈ F and w = µ( f ). Then
(µ,u, v) is an outcome of B .
Step 2: As (µ,u, v) is stable in (A,λ), for each f ∈ F and w ∈W such that w 6=µ( f ), u f +vw ≥
b f w (µ). By construction, b f w (µ) = β f w . Therefore u f + vw ≥ β f w for all f ∈ F and w 6= µ( f ).
Then (µ,u, v) is stable in B .
This result does not imply that there always exist stable outcomes in games with external-
ities. Surely, B ∈A 0 has stable outcomes as it has no externalities (Theorem 1). However, if all
of these outcomes are based on matchings other than µ, then none of them needs to be stable
in (A,λ).
3.1. Existence
The next result provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable outcome in
assignment games with externalities. Namely, there are stable outcomes if agents are pes-
simistic regarding residual behavior and hence careful in forming blocking pairs.
Proposition 1. Fix λ such that pairs always are pessimistic: for each f ∈ F , w ∈ W , and µ ∈
M− f w , λ f w (µ)= 0. Then, for all A ∈A , there is a stable outcome in (A,λ).
Proof. We reverse engineer an outcome (µ˜,u, v) as follows. Let µ˜ ∈M be efficient in (A,λ).
Construct B ∈A 0 as in Observation 1 but based on µ˜, that is, B = (β f w ) f ∈F,w∈W where
β f w =
{
α f w (µ˜) if ( f , w) ∈ µ˜
b f w (µ˜) if ( f , w) 6∈ µ˜.
Then µ˜ is efficient in B . By Theorem 1, there is a stable outcome (µ˜,u, v) in B . By Observa-
tion 1, (µ˜,u, v) is stable in (A,λ).
Our main result says that even the “slightest” optimism can deter the existence of stable
outcomes. This negative result is strong: it requires one pair to be arbitrarily close to pes-
simistic at one matching.
Theorem 2. Fix λ such that pairs are not always pessimistic: there is f ∈ F , w ∈W , and µ ∈
M− f w such that λ f w (µ)= ε> 0. Then there is A ∈A such that (A,λ) has no stable outcome.
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Proof. Denote the agents F = { f1, f2, . . . , fn} and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. Assume the pair f1 ∈ F
and w1 ∈ W is not pessimistic at µˆ ∈M− f1w1 , say λ f1w1 (µˆ) = ε. Without loss, define µˆ and
µ˜ ∈M as follows.
µˆ= {( f1, w2), ( f2, w3), . . . , ( fn−1, wn), ( fn , w1)}
µ˜= {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), . . . , ( fn , wn)}
Define A ∈ A such that, for each fi ∈ F and µ ∈M fi wi+1 , α fi wi+1 (µ) = 1 (mod n). Let also
α f1w1 (µ˜)= 2/ε+1, and let all other values be 0. Then
b f1w1 (µˆ)=
[
λ f1w1 (µˆ)
] ·ω f1w1 + [(1−λ f1w1 (µˆ))] ·pi f1w1 = ε · (2/ε+1)+ (1−ε) ·0= 2+ε.
Moreover, for each fi ∈ F and µ ∈M− fi wi+1 , we haveω fi wi+1 =pi fi wi+1 = 1, hence b fi wi+1 (µ)= 1.
Let u ∈ Rm+ and v ∈ Rn+ be arbitrary. Case 1: Consider (µˆ,u, v). As µˆ( f1) = w2, u f1 + vw2 =
α f1w2 (µˆ) = 1. As µˆ( fn) = w1, u fn + vw1 = α fn w1 (µˆ) = 1. As u fn ≥ 0 and vwn ≥ 0, u f1 + vw1 ≤ 2 <
b f1w1 (µˆ). Hence, f1 and w1 block (µˆ,u, v).
Case 2: Consider (µ,u, v) for µ 6= µˆ. Then there is fi ∈ F such that µ( fi ) 6= wi+1. Without
loss, assume µ( fi ) = w j and µ( fk ) = wi+1 As µ( fi ) = w j , u fi + vw j = α fi w j (µ) = 0. As µ( fk ) =
wi+1, u fk +vwi+1 =α fk wi+1 (µ)= 0. Then u fi = u fk = vw j = vwi+1 = 0, and therefore, u fi +vwi+1 =
0< b fi wi+1 (µ). Hence, fi and wi+1 block (µ,u, v).
As this exhausts all possibilities, there is no stable outcome.
Example 2: Minimal externalities, no stable outcome. Consider an assignment game with
externalities where pairs are “sufficiently” optimistic (n is the number of firms):
∀ f ∈ F, ∀w ∈W, ∀µ ∈M− f w ,
λ f w (µ)> (n−1)/n.
Values are symmetric and externalities are vanishingly small: for some ε> 0, let
∀ f ∈ F, ∀w ∈W,{
α f w (µ) :µ ∈M f w
}= {1,1+ε}.
Then, for all f ∈ F , w ∈W , and µ ∈M− f w , we haveω f w = 1+ε. Lastly, for each µ ∈M , assume
there is at least one pair ( f , w) ∈ µ such that α f w (µ) = 1. Then there is no stable outcome.4
The externalities vanish both in relative and absolute terms:
ω f w
pi f w
= 1+ε
1
→ 1 as ε→ 0 ω f w −pi f w = (1+ε)−1→ 0 as ε→ 0.
Hence, even the smallest of externalities can be problematic if agents are optimistic. ◦
4The smallest value needed to satisfy all pairs exceeds n
(
[(n − 1)/n] · (1+ ε)+ [1/n] · 1), which simplifies to
n(1+ε)−ε. But this is also an upper bound on the total value available.
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3.2. Efficiency
In contrast to the case without externalities, efficiency and stability now no longer go hand
in hand.
Example 3: Inefficient stable matching, unstable efficient matching. Consider the assign-
ment game with externalities with agents F = { f1, f2, f3} and W = {w1, w2, w3} and values
α f w (µ)= 0 except the following:
α f1w1 (µ1)= 2 for µ1 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w3)}
α f2w3 (µ2)= 1 for µ2 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w2)}
α f2w3 (µ3)= 1 for µ3 = {( f1, w2), ( f2, w3), ( f3, w1)}.
Then µ1 is efficient, though agents f2 and w3 block any outcome (µ1,u, v). The inefficient
outcome (µ2,u, v) is stable for u = (0,1,0) and v = (0,0,0). ◦
If all pairs are pessimistic, we can still attain a form of efficiency. The outcome (µ′,u′, v ′) ∈
M ×Rm+ ×Rn+ is a Pareto improvement over (µ,u, v) if, for all f ∈ F and w ∈W , u′f ≥ u f and
v ′w ≥ vw with at least one strict inequality. An outcome is Pareto optimal if it cannot be Pareto
improved.
Proposition 2. Fix λ such that pairs always are pessimistic: for each f ∈ F , w ∈W , µ ∈M− f w ,
λ f w (µ)= 0. Let A ∈A and (µ,u, v) ∈M ×Rm+ ×Rn+ be stable in (A,λ). Then any Pareto improve-
ment (µ′,u′, v ′) ∈M×Rm+ ×Rn+ of (µ,u, v) is stable in (A,λ). As a consequence, (A,λ) has a stable
Pareto optimal outcome.
Proof. Part 1: Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, ( f , w) 6∈ µ′ block (µ′,u′, v ′). As f and w
block (µ′,u′, v ′), b f w (µ′) > u′f + v ′w . As (µ′,u′, v ′) Pareto improves (µ,u, v), u′f ≥ u f and v ′w ≥
vw . Therefore, u′f + v ′w ≥ u f + vw . Case 1: Suppose first ( f , w) 6∈ µ. As f and w always are
pessimistic, b f w (µ)= b f w (µ′). But then b f w (µ)= b f w (µ′)> u′f + v ′w ≥ u f + vw . Then f and w
block the stable outcome (µ,u, v). This is a contradiction. Case 2: Suppose instead µ( f )=w .
Then u f +vw =α f w (µ). But then b f w (µ′)> u′f +v ′w ≥ u f +vw =α f w (µ)≥pi f w . Then f and w
are not pessimistic. This is a contradiction.
Part 2: By Proposition 1, (A,λ) has a stable outcome (µ,u, v). If (µ,u, v) is Pareto optimal,
the proof is completed. So, suppose (µ,u, v) is not Pareto optimal. To obtain a contradiction,
suppose there is no Pareto improvement of (µ,u, v) that itself cannot be Pareto improved.
Then we can produce a sequence of outcomes, each Pareto improving its predecessor, that
is cyclical (that is, the first outcome of the sequence Pareto improves upon the last). This
is a contradiction as agents’ payoffs are increasing throughout the sequence. Hence, there
is a Pareto optimal outcome (µ′,u′, v ′) that Pareto improves (µ,u, v). By Part 1, (µ′,u′, v) is
stable.
3.3. The structure of the set of stable outcomes
As noted in Theorem 1, without externalities the set of stable outcomes forms a complete
lattice with respect to the firms’ profits and the workers’ wages. It has two extreme points:
8
Matching Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3
µ1 = {(1,1), (2,2), (3,3)} 8 6 4
µ2 = {(1,1), (2,3), (3,2)} 3 4 5
µ3 = {(1,2), (2,1), (3,3)} 6 4 4
µ4 = {(1,2), (2,3), (3,1)} 4 8 6
µ5 = {(1,3), (2,1), (3,2)} 5 2 5
µ6 = {(1,3), (2,2), (3,1)} 5 2 5
Table 2: Values for Example 4.
one which all firms prefer to all other stable outcomes, and one which all workers prefer to all
other stable outcomes. We retrieve an immediate corollary of this result if we restrict attention
to individual matchings in the following sense. Formally, for each (A,λ) ∈ E and each µ˜ ∈M ,
the set {
(u, v) ∈Rm+ ×Rn+ : (u, v) is compatible with µ˜ and (µ˜,u, v) is stable in (A,λ)
}
forms a complete lattice with respect to the firms’ profits and the workers’ wages. Hence, if
the problem has a unique stable matching, then the set of stable outcomes forms a lattice.
However, the following example shows that, if there are multiple stable matchings, then the
full set of stable outcomes does not form a lattice.
Example 4: The stable set may not form a lattice. Consider an assignment game with exter-
nalities (A,λ) ∈ E with agents F = { f1, f2, f3} and W = {w1, w2, w3}. All pairs are pessimistic;
values are in Table 2.
There are two stable matchings: µ1 and µ4. The set of stable payoffs compatible with
µ1 forms a complete lattice, with (firm-) minimal element u = (1,0,0) and v = (7,6,4). For
µ4, the stable outcomes form a lattice disjoint from the former set. The minimal element is
u′ = (0,0,1) with v ′ = (5,4,8). For neither matching, the meet u′′ = (0,0,0) is stable. Hence, the
full set of stable outcomes does not form a lattice. See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration.
As agents get more optimistic, they object to more outcomes, and the set of stable out-
comes shrinks. For concreteness, suppose allλ f w (µ)= 0.4. Then onlyµ4 is stable. The smaller
set of stable outcomes is marked in black in Figure 1. ◦
Without externalities, we can “swap” stable matchings: formally, if the outcomes (µ,u, v)
and (µ′,u′, v ′) are stable in A ∈A 0, then so is (µ′,u, v). It follows immediately from Example 4
that this no longer generally is valid for assignment games with externalities.
4. Imposing more structure
In Example 2 and in the proof of Theorem 2, we exploit either (i) large externalities when
agents are optimistic, or (ii) (almost) optimistic agents when externalities are small. In this
section, we impose more structure on the values and the externalities and ask whether this
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Figure 1: The dark grey area shows the lattice structure of the stable payoffs compatible with the
matching µ1 when agents are pessimistic in the example of Example 4. The light grey area consists
of stable payoffs compatible with µ4. The black area consists of stable payoffs compatible with µ4
when agents are more optimistic. Importantly, the two grey areas are disjoint.
overturns the negative findings. The setting is highly restrictive on purpose. Our aim is to
show that, even if values are constructed from a “realistic” problem, our negative results still
apply.
The skill of worker w is measured by s(w): no matter where w is employed, she will add
a value of s(w). Firms produce different products, some of which complement each other,
some substitute. The “degree of complementarity” is captured by κ : F ×F → R. If firms f
and g produce complementary goods, κ( f , g )> 0. If they produce substitutes, κ( f , g )< 0. For
each f ∈ F , κ( f , f )= 1. The value created by f ∈ F and w ∈W at µ ∈M f w is given by
α f w (µ)=
∑
f ′∈F
κ( f , f ′) · s(µ( f ′)).
Example 5: Negative results not overturned by more structure. Let F = { f1, f2, f3} and W =
{w1, w2, w3}. For simplicity, the skill of wi ∈ W is given by s(wi ) = 2i . That is, w1 is the
least productive worker, w3 the most. Firms f1 and f3 produce substitutable goods (differ-
ent brands of phones), say κ( f1, f3)=−0.5. Firm f2 produces a complementary good (phone
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Matching Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3
µ1 = {(1,1), (2,2), (3,3)} 1 8 7
µ2 = {(1,1), (2,3), (3,2)} 3 9 6
µ3 = {(1,2), (2,1), (3,3)} 2 7 5
µ4 = {(1,2), (2,3), (3,1)} 6 9 3
µ5 = {(1,3), (2,1), (3,2)} 5 7 2
µ6 = {(1,3), (2,2), (3,1)} 7 8 1
Table 3: Values for Example 5.
accessories), say κ( f1, f2) = κ( f2, f3) = 0.5.5 Therefore, at µ1 = {( f1, w1), ( f2, w2), ( f3, w3)}, the
pair ( f1, w1) creates a value of 1:
α f1w1 (µ1) = κ( f1, f1) · s
(
µ1( f1)
) + κ( f1, f2) · s(µ1( f2)) + κ( f1, f3) · s(µ1( f3))
= 1 · s(w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
+ 1/2 · s(w2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
+ (−1/2) · s(w3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−3
= 1.
The values are summarized in Table 3.
If pairs always are pessimistic, then every matching is stable. However, if we consider the
case where no pair is pessimistic, that is, when there is ε > 0 such that, for all f ∈ F , w ∈W ,
and µ ∈M f w , we have λ f w (µ)≥ ε, then there is no stable outcome – no matter how small we
make ε. We only give proof to this claim for µ1. The exercise can be repeated for the other
matchings.
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that (µ1,u, v) is stable. For f1 and w2 not to block,
u f1 + vw2 = u f1 + (8−u f2 )≥ b f1w2 (µ1)≥ ε ·ω f1w2 + (1−ε) ·pi f1w2 >pi f1w2 = 2.
Then u f2 −u f1 < 6. For f2 and w1 not to block,
u f2 + vw1 = u f2 + (1−u f1 )≥ b f2w1 (µ1)= 7⇔ u f2 −u f1 ≥ 6.
This is contradictory to the strict inequality just found. Thus, no matter the outcome (µ1,u, v),
one of the pair blocks. ◦
5. Conclusion
We have shown that the introduction of externalities into the assignment game overturns
all the classical results. In particular, we show that (i) there are problems that have no sta-
ble outcome, (ii) stable outcomes need not be efficient (maximize total value created), (iii)
efficient outcomes need not be stable, and (iv) the set of stable outcomes need not form a
lattice.
5Number are chosen to simplify the example; more “varied” example are available upon request.
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The positive finding of paper is the following knife-edge result: if all agents are pessimistic,
then there are stable outcomes in all assignment games with externalities. The result is com-
plemented by a strong negative finding that shows that even the slightest optimism can be
complemented by values that yield an assignment game with externalities that lacks stable
outcomes.
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